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Abstract
This study examines the effect of foreign institutional shareholders (FIS) on corporate
payout policy. The study employs 97 Indonesian manufacturing firms listed on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2011-2015. Multivariate Tobit and Logit are employed to
estimate the model. The result confirms the bird in the hand theory that FISs need
assurance of their investments in the emerging market. FIS has a monitoring role over the
firms since they have the ability to detect the firm’s quality and the agency problem within.
The result confirms that the presence of the FIS in the firm has a positive and significant
effect on both measures of corporate payout policy, dividend to net income and dividend to
total asset. The presence of the FIS increases the propensity of the firm to pay a dividend.
.
Keywords: Foreign institutional shareholders, dividend payout, agency problem
Abstrak
Penelitian ini menguji pengaruh pemegang saham institusi asing (FIS) terhadap kebijakan
pembayaran perusahaan terhadap 97 perusahaan manufaktur Indonesia yang terdaftar di
Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2011-2015. Analisis multivariat menggunakan Tobit dan
Logit. Hasil mengkonfirmasi bird in the hand theory bahwa FIS membutuhkan jaminan
dalam berinvestasi di pasar negara berkembang. FIS memiliki kemampuan dalam
mendeteksi kualitas dan masalah keagenan perusahaan sehingga secara tidak langsung FIS
menjalankan fungsi monitoring. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa keberadaan FIS di
perusahaan berpengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap kebijakan dividen perusahaan.
Kehadiran FIS meningkatkan kecenderungan perusahaan untuk membayar dividen.
.
Keywords: Pemegang saham insitusional asing, kebijakan dividen, masalah keagenan
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INTRODUCTION
Dividend income is still an investor’
objective. Firms still use a dividend to distribute surplus cash to their shareholders
than share repurchase in the Indonesian
market. This has been a drive on why the
dividend topic is still relevant to be researched. Black (1976) argues that there are
no absolute patterns in what and how firms
decide their corporate payout 3 policy. The
difference in, such as, market, legal institutional, and ownership environment, have
been reasons in how dividend policy is decided. Miller and Modigliani (1961) state
that in certain circumstances in which some
assumptions are applied, like no information asymmetry, no transaction cost, and
no tax, the investor will be indifferent between capital gain and dividend payout.
In the perfect market of what Miller
and Modigliani (1961) have mentioned, if
shareholders hold good stocks, they don’t
have to wait for a dividend payment. The
liquidity necessity is satisfied by creating a
homemade dividend at a low cost and at
any time. In an imperfect market like an
emerging market, with high severity of
agency problems, investors favor dividend
payment to compensate for the uncertainty
(Deshmukh 2005), and dividend can be a
stable income as investors demand a return
for their investments. From the governance
side, dividend policy can reduce the
insider’s incentive to use cash flow for expropriation (Easterbrook 1984; Jensen
1986). An expropriation is an act by misusing the power owned by the insider to
exploit the firm’s resources for a private
benefit (Faccio et al. 2001).
This study examines the impact of
foreign institutional shareholders (hereafter: FIS) of the Indonesian manufacturing
firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange between 2011 and 2015. The FIS's
impact on the corporate payout is
expectedly significant in the emerging
3

The term “payout” and “dividend” refer to the
firm’s dividend payout policy. These terms will be
used in this study interchangeably.
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market, which suffers from uncertainty and
with severe agency problems (Baba 2009).
Moreover, when the ownership of a foreign
institution increased, the FIS's incentive to
monitor will be stronger than before
(Hartzell and Starks 2003; Maug 1998).
Indonesia is one of the emerging
market countries. Claessens et al. (2000)
find that the firm's ownership in Indonesia
is highly concentrated and about two-thirds
of the firms are family firms. Highconcentrated firms always bear severe
agency problems. The family, as a founder
and owner, wants to keep taking control of
the firm resources. Thus, the corporate decision will base on the insider's interests
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). One of the
corporate policies is dividend policy. The
agency problem of free cash flow occurs
when insiders tend to retain the earnings
than to disgorge them to the shareholders
(Grossman and Hart 1980; Easterbrook
1984; Jensen 1986). Rhee and Wang (2009)
state that public shareholdings in Indonesia
are dominated by foreign in the institutional form, such as mutual funds, pension
funds, insurance funds, and brokerage. The
individual shareholdings are only 5% of the
total free float compared to the foreign
shareholdings, which take about 70% of the
free float. Thus, it is plausible that the FIS
affects the corporate payout of the
Indonesian firms. FIS is an institutional
investor that trades in large numbers of
shares and has a large stake of shareholdings with a stable portfolio (Bushee
1998). FIS is considered as sophisticated
investors that can detect the firm’s quality
and the agency problem inside (Allen et al.
2000; Chang et al. 2015).
Dvorak (2015) adds that FIS has
more trading experience and expertise than
local institutional investors. However, the
domestic institutional investor has more
information advantages than FIS since the
information will not have barriers, for example, in language and cultural distance.
On the other side, any investor needs assurance of their investment in emerging countries such as Indonesia. Allen et al. (2000)
and Baba (2009) state that FIS has a strong
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preference for the dividend-paying firms.
Free cash flow is a source of agency problems of the firm like overspending and
overinvestment by the managers, which
may benefit the insiders than the shareholders, and making the dividend payment
low. When FISs have increased their shareholdings, the power exerted will be bigger
than before, affecting the corporate policy
(Hartzell and Starks 2003). Therefore,
Easterbrook (1984) and Chang et al. (2015)
add that the firm will use the dividend to
mitigate agency problems of the firm’s financial side.
Previous studies regarding FIS have
been conducted in the context of market
liquidity (Maug 1998), merger and acquisition (Hartzell and Starks 2003), tax clientele investor (Allen et al. 2000), and share
repurchase (Jagannathan et al. 2000). In
developed countries like the U.S., Allen et
al. (2000) correlate FIS with the tax
bracket. Some institutional investors are
not subject to tax, like mutual funds and
pension funds. Then, they tend to invest
and increase the stake in the dividendpaying firm (Maug 1998). This finding
probably follows or does not follow the
same pattern for the Indonesian market
since the government applies tax to foreign
investors. Wherefore the firms pay the dividend, FIS is still attracted to invest in the
firm’s stock. The previous studies, which
have conducted in both developed and
emerging markets, give mixed results. For
instance, a study by Ferreira et al. (2010)
does not prove that FIS impacts corporate
payout policy. Then, Chiang and Lai
(2015) show that FIS positively affect corporate payout policy in Taiwan. Followed
the same result by Jeon et al. (2011), FIS
positively affects a corporate payout in
South Korea. Based on those findings, this
research tries to confirm the FIS's effect on
the dividend policy when conducted in an
emerging market like Indonesia.
This research makes several contributions. First, contribute to the corporate finance dividend literature in the framework
of agency problems and governance. Indonesia is one of the emerging countries

loaded by agency problems and the low
level of investor protection (Faccio et al.
2001). Some previous studies of payout
policy in the Indonesian market correlate
the FIS’s impact on the corporate payout
policy. The gap between this study and the
previous is the conducted estimation
approach. This study uses maximum likelihood estimations, Tobit, and Logit, which
fit with the characteristics of the data observed. Using the most common approach
that the previous studies employ, such as
OLS, the result will likely suffer from validity issues since the dividend data are
about to pay or to retain, and to be closer to
zero or one.
A dividend is considered an effective
means to alleviate agency problem and a
result of improved corporate governance.
Different from the previous studies using
OLS (Chiang and Lai 2015), this study examines the impact of FIS on the corporate
payout policy estimated by Tobit and Logit,
which fits the data characteristics. This
study shows that FIS is consistent and positively impact corporate payout, employing
three measures of corporate payout such as
payout ratio, dividend to total assets, and
propensity to pay a dividend.
Second, this study results contribute
and confirm the fact that in emerging markets the presence of FIS will encourage
firms to pay dividends since the FIS can
detect a firm's quality and the agency problems within. The higher the FIS stake in the
firm, the better the governance and the
higher the chance to gain funds for the investment projects. Then, on the investors'
side, the finding is a consideration in investing in the Indonesian stock market by
acknowledging the FIS effect on the dividend policy, noticing that the larger shares
owned by the FIS, the better the firm governed.
Third, the result will hopefully give
insight into the Indonesian authority to
make a regulation that creates an appropriate business environment for FIS. In 2014,
the Financial Service Authority passed a
new regulation that the public shareholders
(non-controlling and non-primary) are
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allowed to increase their stakes at least
7.5% of the paid capital. With this new
regulation, the number of FISs may be
larger than before in the Indonesian market.
The findings prove that the effect of the
FIS increases the rate and propensity of the
dividend. Thus, the monitoring mechanism,
both the firm and the market, which is done
indirectly by FIS, is effective in the
Indonesian market. For a reminder, this
study proceeded as follows: research introduction. Section 2 explains the literature
background and hypothesis building. Section 3 describes the data and methodology.
Section 4 shows the results. Section 5 is the
discussion, and then Section 6 is the conclusion.
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the Indonesian market during the observation period 2011-2015. The big institutions,
such as pension funds, insurance, or other
large fiduciary institutions are dominating
the large stake of foreign ownership in the
Indonesian market (Rhee and Wang 2009).
The behavior of these fiduciary institutions
roots in the conservative act, prudential investment decisions, specifically, when they
invest in the emerging market with high
uncertainty (Howe 1992). The assurance
for their investment will be in the first
place to attain by preferably investing in
firms with a low agency conflict and
paying more dividends (Baba 2009;
Duygun et al. 2018).
Hypotheses Formulation

LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

The effect of FIS on the cash dividend proportion to firms ’net income

Corporate Governance in Indonesia,
Foreign Institutional Shareholders and
Payout Policy
Indonesia, as an emerging market, is
considered to have protruding agency problems and low corporate governance.
Claessens et al. (2000) and Mulyani (2016)
state that family firms are dominating the
Indonesian capital market, making the
firms become heavily concentrated and entrenched by the family members, who hold
positions in the firms’ board or management. The firm decision may lead to the
bearing costs to their minorities. For instance, the decision for their free cash flow
tends to retain than to disgorge it Easterbrook (1984). Asian Development Bank in
2000 found that the Indonesian firms have
low transparency in their reporting, making
the information dissemination uneven.
These findings align with the truth that
Indonesia is a civil law country, which La
Porta et al. (2000) argue that the civil law
countries have low investor protection than
common law countries that pay more dividends than civil law countries.
Albeit all the findings that have
stated, the FIS is not reluctant to invest in
the Indonesian Market. OJK statistical data
shows the uptrend of foreign ownership in

FIS is considered as sophisticated investors who relatively have an ability to
detect the firm’s quality and the agency
conflict within (Allen et al. 2000, Khanna
and Pallepu 1999) and demand more transparency of the firms they have invested on
(Duygun et al. 2018). FIS is free from the
local pressures, thus make them more independent and effective at monitoring the
controlling shareholders Farinha (2003)
and Cao et al. (2017). However, FIS still
deals with higher information asymmetry
than domestic investors (Rhee and Wang
2009; Baba 2009), and the bearing risk is
high in the Indonesian Market. FIS will
demand a dividend payment as an
assurance for their investment in the uncertainty circumstances (Baba 2009). So that,
dividend-paying firms attract FIS and have
considered as good governed firms
Grinstein and Michaely (2005).
The proposed arguments of FIS in
this study align with the agency theory
framework. Since paying the dividend is
preferable to FIS, it is also a means to minimize insider’s incentive from misusing the
firm's free cash flow (Easterbrook 1984,
Jensen (1976). FIS typically hold a large
stake in a firm, they can influence the
firm’s decision through voting rights and
give an exit treatment when they are not
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satisfied (Firth 2016). FIS may increase
their larger stake during their investment
horizons, thus, by having a larger stake
than before, FIS will increase their incentives in monitoring the firm. These arguments make the correlation of FIS to the
corporate payout policy expectedly significant-positive. Some previous researches,
such as Maug (1998), Hartzell and Starks
(2003), Baba (2009), Jeon et al. (2011),
Chiang and Lai (2015), support the positive
impact of FIS on the corporate payout
policy. Based on these arguments, the hypothesis is arranged as follows:
H1: FIS in Indonesia has a positive
effect on the cash dividend proportion to firms’ net income.
The effect of FIS on the cash dividend
proportion to firms’ total assets
Black (1976) states that the decision
of a firm in paying the dividend is puzzled.
Assuming a signaling theory is applied,
firms convey their prospects to the market
by paying the dividend to gain market
appreciation (Bhattacharya et al. 1979).
However, this view may result in some
anomalies. For instance, firms may disgorge the cash to the shareholders even
though they have negative earnings, or
firms still pay a dividend while their investment projects are low or investing in
some projects encouraged by the managers'
specific interest (Howe 1992). To circumvent these issues, this study normalizes the
payout ratio by scaling the annual cash
dividend with the total asset, revering to the
several previous studies which make using
that measure, such as Li and Zhao (2008),
Grinstein and Michaely (2005), Ben Nasr
(2015). Based on these arguments, the hypothesis is arranged as follows:
H2: FIS in Indonesia has a positive
effect on the cash dividend proportion to firms’ total assets.
The effect of FIS on the propensity of
firms to pay dividend
As the stated arguments of both hypotheses, we propose that the propensity to
pay dividend for domestic firms in the

presence of FIS is higher than firms without FIS presence. Since the FIS has the
ability to detect the firms before they decide to invest, the dividend-paying firms
itself already desirable for FIS (Allen and
Michaely 2003). Thus, in the first place, the
presence of the FIS will enhance the propensity of a firm to pay dividend. Based on
the argument, the H3 is arranged as
followed.
H3: FIS in Indonesia has a positive
effect on the propensity of firms to
pay dividend.
METHOD
Research Model
The dependent variable in this study
is the dividend payout. This study employs
three measures of payout policy which
have been documented in several previous
research. They are (1) cash dividend to net
income (Payout I) (2) cash dividend to total
assets (Payout II) and (3) dummy variable
of propensity to pay dividend (Propensity)
1 for a dividend-paying firm and 0 otherwise. The first measure, Payout I, is the
total cash dividend scaled by the total net
income. This has been a common measure
of corporate payout policy. The second
measure of corporate payout policy is Payout II which is measured by total cash dividend scaled by total assets. Li and Zhao
(2008) employ the same measure to ensure
that the result will not be affected by the
stock price variation in which some firms
may likely to pay dividend while their
earnings are negative.4
The Independent variable in this
study is foreign institutional shareholders
(Foreign) measured by total shares owned
by FIS in the firms. The specified model
controls the factors which are widely
acknowledge affecting dividend policy,
such as firm size, leverage, growth, and
4

Following Allen and Michaely (2003), assume that
the signaling theory hold, price variation may affect
the result. The measure has employed by several
pervious researches such as: Grinstein and Michaely
(2005); Li and Zhao (2008).

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Desember 2020, Vol. 17, No. 2, hal 134-149

profitability. Fama and French (2001)
suggest that big size firm and high
profitability firms are firms which pay a
dividend. So, firm size and profitability are
controlled by Size and ROE variable. The
growth factor also affects dividend policy.
Based on Warrad et al. (2012) the growth
factor of a firm is an expectation of future
profitability through the investment opportunity. In this study, the growth factor is
measured by total market value scaled by
total book value of equity (Yaram 2015;
Moin et al. 2019). Mancinelli and Ozkan
(2006) argue that when firms bear a high
debt, prevent to have cash shortfall. When
firms have shortfall cash, they tend to skip
dividend. Setiawan et al. (2016) suggest
that most firms in Indonesia have their
corporate payout is affected by the debt
level. So, the leverage level is controlled by
the leverage variable in the model. Time invariant and industry sectors are also
controlled in the specified model. Each
definition and the previous works of the
variables employed are provided in table 1
below.
This study employs Tobit regression
to answer H1 and H2, and logit regression to
answer H3. The most common approach
that often to conduct for a similar study,
OLS, will make the result suffers from
inconsistency and biased since the
characteristic of the response variable is
censored data Cameron and Triverdi
(2005). Censored data in this study implies
that the value of the response variable
cannot be negative, but within the range 0
to 1, and for the logit model, which is the
discrete-dichotomous response, 1 or 0. This
study also develops H3 to support the
study’s finding, H1, and H2. The results
from the estimation will be parallel
supporting the findings. Below, the latent
regression
models
are
specified,
respectively, for Tobit and logit:
,
which
is a continuous response of the
dividend ration, which is unobserved,
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within the range 0 to 1 and satisfies the
observed specifications below:

is the exogenous variable to the . is
the parameter and
is the error term,
which is both are estimated by maximizing
the function’s log-likelihood.
For logit regression,

Which
is the dichotomous response, 1 or
0, and satisfies the specifications below:

is exogenous variable to the , with
conditional probability Pr( = 1|
. is
the parameter and
is the error term,
which is both estimated by exerting logistic
distribution to maximize the probability of
an event, in this study is the propensity to
pay a dividend to be likely happening.
Therefore, the baseline models for this
study are specified as follows:

Where:
Payout I

=

Payout II

=

Propensity

=

Foreign

=

Controls

=

Ɛ

=
=
=


1−5

Dividend payout ratio I of firm i in
the year t
Dividend payout ratio II of firm i
in the year t
Dummy variable of propensity to
pay dividend of firm i in the year t,
1 for dividend payers, 0 otherwise
Foreign institutional shareholders
of firm i in the year t
Control variables of firm i in the
year t
Error of firm i in the year t
Intercept
Regression coefficient
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Table 1
Variable Definitions
No

Variables

Definitions and Measurement

Researchers

1

Payout I

Dividend payout I, measured by total cash dividend
scaled by net income.

Baba (2009), Jeon et al.
(2009)

2

Payout II

Dividend payout II, measured by total cash dividend
scaled by total asset.

Li and Zhao (2008), Jeon et
al. (2009).

3

Propensity

Dividend payer firms parameter, measured by a dummy Baba (2009), Chiang and
variable, 1 for dividend payers and 0 otherwise.
Lai (2015)

4

Foreign

Foreign institutional shareholders (FIS), measured by
the percentage of shares owned by foreign institutional
to total outstanding shares.

Chiang and Lai (2015)

5

Size

Firm’s size, measured by Ln of total asset.

Fama and French (2001)

6

ROE

Firm profitability, measured by net income scaled by Francis et al. (2004);
total equity.
Pagalung (2006)

7

Growth

Firm growth measures investment opportunity. Firm
Fama and French (2001),
growth is measured by total market value scaled by total Jeon (2012), Yaram (2015),
book value of equity.
Moin et al. (2019)

8

Leverage

Firm leverage level, measured by total debt scaled by Mancinelli and Ozkan
total asset.
(2006), Setiawan et al.
(2016)
Table 2.1
Firms Sample of Manufacturing Sector 2011-2015
Manufacturing Industry
Basic & Chemicals
Sector

Miscellaneous
Sector

Consumer
Goods Sector

Total

Firms

41

21

35

97

Observations

205

105

175

485

Variables Definition Sample
This study uses Indonesian manufacturing firms that are listed on the Indonesia
Stock Exchange period 2011-2015. This
study defines some considerations using the
manufacturing sector in the observed period. First, the manufacturing firms' reports
are fully available during 2011-2015. The
completeness of the data supports this
study’s property, which keeps the observations in a balanced series. The period of
2011-2015 is considered a stable period in
the context of macroeconomic circum-

stances. So, neither lag nor crisis can condition the result of this study. Second, manufacturing firms have consisted of a larger
portion of the Indonesian capital market
composition than other sectors and have
indirectly give a significantly big contribution to the GDP. Based on these considerations, manufacturing firms will have a bigger propensity to disgorge their cash as a
dividend or to retain it. Firms with incomplete reports and negative payouts are
dropped from the estimation. The sampling
ends up with 97 firms or 485 observations.
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Table 2.2
The Proportion and Payout Ratio of Dividend-Paying Firms
per Industry Sector 2011-2015
Manufacturing Industry
Basic & Chemicals
sector

Miscellaneous
sector

Consumer Goods
sector

Proportion of
dividend paying firms

0.509

0.514

0.560

Payout ratio of
dividend per industry
sector

0.121

0.168

0.262

Table 3
Payout Ratio of dividend Paying Firms with FIS and non-FIS
Dividend-Paying
Firms

Payout I

Propensity

Payout II

Mean

Med.

N

Mean

Med.

N

N

0.326

0.306

87

0.055

0.027

87

87

Low (T2)

0.300

0.300

73

0.090

0.024

73

73

High (T3)

0.469

0.388

81

0.042

0.029

81

81

241

241

Non-Foreign (T1)
Foreign
Shareholders:

N

241

T (1, 2, 3): Tercile 1st, 2nd, and 3rd

RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics of Sample Data
Table 2.1, the data show the manufacturing industry with its sectors in this
current study. Basic & Chemicals Industry
consists of 7 sub-sectors. Miscellaneous
Industry consists of 4 sub-sectors. Consumer goods consist of 5 sub-sectors. The
table shows that the basic and chemical
sector is a sector with the highest number
of sample firms of all, which about 41
firms, followed by the consumer goods and
miscellaneous sector, respectively, and 35
and 21 firms5. The consumer goods sector
5

The complete descriptive of paying and nonpaying dividend firms are available in appendix 1.

is a sector that consists of the most proportion of dividend-paying firms and the highest payout ratio of all sectors. Both are
shown in table 2.2.
Table 3 presents the dividend-paying
firms overview based on the presence of
the FIS. There are non-FIS and FIS firms
which both are dividend-paying firms.
Foreign shareholders amount is dividedinto
terciles which are non-FIS, low FIS, and
high FIS. There are 87 of the non-FIS firms
or firms with local ownership that pay
about 33% of dividend payout. There are
154 firms of FIS, which consist of firms
with high (81 firms) and low FIS (73
firms). Firms with higher FIS averagely
pay more dividends (47%) than firms with
lower FIS (30%).
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Table 4
Descriptive Data of Research Variables
Variables

Mean

S.D.

P10

P25

P50

P75

P90

N

Payout I

0.182

0.244

0

0

0

0.318

0.498

485

Payout II

0.298

0.692

0

0

0

1

1

485

Propensity

0.497

0.501

0

0

0

1

1

485

Foreign

0.344

0.341

0

0

0

1

1

485

14.203

1.586

12.398

13.155

14

14.984

16.570

485

Leverage

0.473

0.232

0.197

0.292

0.472

0.620

0.766

485

ROE

0.147

0.641

0.0004

0.003

0.016

0.042

0.141

485

Growth

1.193

0.921

0.428

0.688

1.00

1.50

2.00

485

Size

Table 4 provides the descriptive data
of firms’ payouts, foreign shareholders and
firm’s characteristics of manufacturing
firms period 2011-2015 with 485 total
observations. Payout I is the ratio of cash
dividend to net income indicates a low
level of dividend payments of the
manufacturing firms (M = .18, Mdn = 0).
The finding confirms (Faccio et al. 2001)
that Indonesia has considered a country that
pays a low-level dividend. The propensity
to pay a dividend for the manufacturing
firm is 50% of the total observations or
about 241 observations. The payout level
and the propensity to pay is above the
median. This means the data are skewed to
the left. Since the data is skewed to the left,
multivariate Tobit is suggested than
estimating using OLS in order to prevent
biased results (Cameron and Triverdi
2009). The firm’s size of the employed
firm samples is relatively high and highly
varied from each other (M = 14.20, SD =
1.59; Mdn. = 14.00). The firms bear a
moderate debt level (M = .47; Mdn = 47).
Table 5 presents the correlation
between each variable in this study. Payout
I, II, and Propensity as expected are highly
correlated, respectively, r(485) = .97, p <
.01; r(485) = .93, p < .01; r(485) = .93, p <
.01. This finding means that each measure
is similar in measuring corporate payout.

Foreign shareholder's dummy variable
shows a positive correlation to each
dividend payout measure indicates that
firms with foreign shareholders tend to
have a higher dividend rate and a higher
propensity to pay a dividend. Other
controls show positive and negative
correlations, like Size and ROE, are
showing positive correlation and Leverage
is showing a negative correlation.
Table 6 shows the expected signs of
the variables employed. Foreign as the
main independent variable is expected to
have a positive effect on the payout policy.
Control variables such as Size and ROE are
expected to have a positive effect on the
payout policy, while Leverage and Growth
are expected to have a negative effect on
the payout policy. The estimation sign
column shows the result of the estimated
model. As expected, variable Foreign has a
positive effect on the payout policy, as well
as control variables such as Size and ROE
(Table 7; Payout 2). Leverage shows
a negative effect on the payout policy as
expected. Meanwhile, variable Growth is
expected to be negative, but the result
shows a positive effect of Growth on the
payout policy.
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Table 5
Spearman Correlation Matrix
Payout I
Payout I

Payout II

Payout II

Propensity

Foreign

Size

Leverage

ROE

MVBV

1

0.968***

1

(0.00)
Propensity

Foreign

Size

Leverage

ROE

Growth

0.927***

0.927***

1

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.115**

0.112**

0.059**

(0.011)

(0.014)

(0.019)

0.376***

0.368***

0.356***

-0.063

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.164)

-0.296*** -0.346***

-0.288***

-0.061

0.195***

1

1

1

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.183)

(0.00)

0.469***

0.557***

0.442***

0.207***

0.201***

0.046

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.311)

0.315***

0.343***

0.279***

0.123***

0.325***

-0.007

0.354***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.007)

(0.00)

(0.879)

(0.00)

1

*** Sig. 1%, ** Sig. 5%, * Sig. 10%. The number in the parentheses is the p-value

Table 6
Expected and Estimation Result Signs of Research
Variables on the Payout Policy
Expected Sign

Estimation Result Sign*

Foreign

+

+

Size

+

+

Leverage

-

-

ROE

+

+

Growth

-

+

Variables

* Column “Estimated Sign” is based on the result of the estimation from Table 7

1
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Table 7
The Result of Foreign Institutional Shareholders Estimation on Corporate Payout
Corporate Payout
Payout I

Payout II

Propensity

Tobit (t)

Tobit (t)

Logit (z)

0.122 ***

0.503 ***

0.406 *

(2.43)

(3.33)

(1.70)

0.10 ***

0.189 ***

0.770 ***

(9.49)

(5.19)

(7.76)

-0.759 ***

-1.939 ***

-4.727 ***

(-7.38)

(-6.67)

(-6.48)

0.02

0.212 *

0.013

(0.47)

(1.75)

(0.07)

0.103 ***

0.248 ***

0.581 ***

(3.65)

(3.67)

(4.06)

-1.168 ***

-2.540 ***

-9.225 ***

(-8.00)

(-4.97)

(-7.41)

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sectors

Yes

Yes

Yes

PseudoR2

0.318

0.189

0.277

N obs

485

485

485

Foreign

Size

Leverage

ROE

Growth

Intercept

*** Sig. 1%, ** Sig. 5%, * Sig. 10%. The number in the parantheses is the p-value

Table 7 provides the estimation
results of foreign shareholders on corporate
payout policy. Foreign shareholders is
positive and significant on the Payout I (β =
0.122, t = 2.43, p < 0.01), Payout II (β =
0.503, t = 3.33, p < 0.01), and Propensity (β
= 0.406, z= 1.70, p < 0.10). The results
show that foreign shareholders impact the
dividend payout policy of manufacturing
firms in Indonesia. The presence of foreign
shareholders in the firms increases the
payout level and propensity to pay a
dividend. These findings confirm the

previous studies by Baba (2009), Chiang
and Lai (2015), and Jeon et al. (2011).
Table 8 panels A and B provide the
marginal effect and odd ratio of FIS on the
corporate payout of manufacturing firms
period 2011-2015. In panel A, the results
show that the FIS gives a significant
positive impact on the corporate payout,
Payout I and Payout II. The increasing of
FIS by 1% will increase the magnitude of
Payout I by about 12.2% when all variables
at their mean values. A similar result for
the Payout II model, the increase of FIS by
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Table 8
The Marginal Effect and Odd Ratio of
Foreign Institutional Shareholders on the Payout
A.

The Marginal Effect of Foreign institutional shareholders On Corporate Payout

Payout I

0.122 ***
(2.44)

Payout II

0.503 ***
(3.33)

B.

Odd Ratio of Foreign Institutional Shareholders on the Payout

Propensity

1.50 ***
(1.70)

*** Sig. 1%, ** Sig. 5%, * Sig. 10%. The number in the parentheses is the p-value

1% will increase the magnitude of Payout
II about 50.3% when all variables at their
mean values. In table 8 Panel B provides
the odd ratio of FIS to the firm’s propensity
to pay dividend. The results show that the
bigger domination of FIS shares in a firm,
the bigger propensity to pay dividends
about 1.50 times bigger compared with the
firm without FIS or fully domestic ownership.
Discussion
From the analysis, this study finds
that the Indonesian capital market has been
dominated by foreign investors in the form
of institutions. Chemicals industries are
dominant in the manufacturing sector of
Indonesia which has 7 sub-sectors and
about 41 firms observed in this study,
followed by miscellaneous and Basic &
Chemical Industry. It implies that the
chemical industries drive the Indonesian
manufacturing sector. However, the proportion of firms and the highest rate of dividend payout ratios are the only brought by
the consumer goods industry.
Almost 50% of the firms in the manufacturing sector have FIS in their shareholding compositions. This means that
stocks of manufacturing firms are still foreign investors’ preference in their invest-

ment portfolios. However, the surprise
from the findings shows that firms which
have non-FIS are still dividend-paying
firms with 33% of the firms’ total income.
Then, firms with a high presence of FIS
pay more dividends, about 47% of the
firms’ total income than to the firms with
low FIS which about 30% of firms’ total
income. This implies that the most firms in
the Indonesian manufacturing sector are at
the growing phase firms which need more
funding to expand their business and FIS
are long investment horizon investor so that
the FISs will invest at the good quality
firms for the sake of future return yet still
pay a dividend even though those firms pay
a lower rate of payout.
The FISs are considered as sophisticated investors which able to detect the
firm's quality and will stick with firms that
have good governance by paying the dividend. This finding supports previous studies by Khanna and Pallepu (1999), Allen et
al. (2000), Baba (2009). Meanwhile, on the
other side, the tax regulation imposed by
the Indonesian government reminds unstable which keeps changing from time to
time or from regime to regime. This will
make the FIS stick with the firms which
have a flexible rate in paying the surplus
cash. Dividend-paying firms give FIS as
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surance of their investment in the Indonesian capital market which is considered as
an uncertain market.
However, when the models ran, the
findings show that the presence of FIS is
statistically significant in its effect on the
dividend policy. The finding is consistent
and supports the hypotheses that the presence of FIS will give a positive impact on
the likelihood of the firm to pay dividend
and support the previous studies by Chiang
and Lai (2015), Jeon et al. (2011), Baba
(2009). These findings are supported by the
coefficient and marginal effect of the FIS
on each payout measures. However, the
impact of FIS on dividend policy is slightly
small for Payout I measures (12%), but
higher for Payout II (50%), also for the
likelihood of a firm to pay dividend (41%).
This is a surprise since payout I is a common payout measure throughout the majority of previous researches. Both the coefficient and the marginal value of FIS on the
Payout II are higher than the Payout I and
III. However, these findings are consistent
with this research hypothesis that FIS gives
a positive impact on Payout II. Payout II is
a proportion of cash dividend to the firms’
total assets. Thus, this is consistent with
Fama and French (2001) that the bigger the
firms, the bigger ability of firms in paying
dividend. For the control variables, the
most factor, which affects the manufacturing firms in the Indonesian market to pay
dividend, is the leverage factor. It is believed and scientifically proven that firms
will make a priority in managing their cash
flow by using their cash to pay off the debt.
The result also shows that the growth factor
gives the opposite effect on each payout
measure. This is different than what this
study has predicted. It is believed that the
firms with a high investment opportunity
signal their future prospect through dividend payments in Indonesian manufacturing firms.
CONCLUSION
This study examines the effect of foreign institutional shareholders on corporate
payout policy using manufacturing firms

listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2011-2015 and generating about 97
sample firms or 485 observations. The
specified model using firm size, leverage
level, and profitability level by investors as
controls. In order to alleviate the variation
in each sector and time, the model also controls the year variant and industry sector.
Dividend payout is measured by the ratio of
cash dividend to net income, cash dividend
to total assets, and dichotomous indicator
of payer and non-payer firm.
First, the result shows the fact that
FIS is impacting corporate payout policy.
Several studies have conducted foreign institutions as explanatory of corporate policy
and this study is one of those studies which
has confirmed the fact. This study shows
that the impact of FIS on the corporate
payout is positive statistically and economically significant. This is confirming the
bird in the hand theory that FIS wants assurance of their investment in the emerging
country. This finding confirms the similar
research which is conducted by (Baba
2009; Chiang and Lai 2015; Jeon et al.
2011). Firms with a presence of FIS has a
high-level payout and increase the propensity to pay a dividend. In conclusion, dividend-paying firms attract FIS. This confirms the signaling theory that in order to
attract sophisticated investors which able to
detect the firm’s quality and agency problem, firms will use dividends as a signal to
the market. Improved governance is shown
by the dividend payment when the FIS captures this, FIS will invest and/or raise the
stakes in the firm. This way will eventually
affect corporate policy. The finding also
confirms that dividend payment is a means
to mitigate agency problems in the firms
and the presence of FIS in the firms is an
effective way to maintain good governance
by encouraging insiders to pay dividend.
However, the current study has several limitations that can be suggestions for
further research. The limitations may come
from the data and the model. First, this
five-year study does not include all of the
non-financial firms. Second, the research
model may be arbitrary and does not em
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ploy other factors which empirically affecting the payout policy; for instance, the
profitability of assets, firm liquidity, and
controlling shareholder, nevertheless, the
authors believe that several important factors already employed in explaining the
impact of FIS on the payout policy which
based on the previous studies explained
earlier in the current study. Regarding these
limitations, the results derived from the
manufacturing sides only and do not explain the payout behavior for the whole
non-financial firms in the observed market.
The authors suggest utilizing most of the
non-financial firms of the Indonesian market in longer series than this current study
has and employ more essential factors for
further research, so the impact of FIS on
the Indonesian listed firms will give wider
inference. Then, this study is hopefully able
to give insight to the investors about the
dividend of manufacturing industries in Indonesia and hopefully, the study is able to
give insight in order to improve firm governance through dividend payment.
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